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A. Introduction 
Flexible integration has been part of Community and Union law for quite a while. Uniform 
integration was harder and harder to achieve as both the number of Member States and the depth 
of integration rose. Therefore, major steps in integration came with the price of opt-outs and 
special treatment, enshrined in the constitutional fabric of Union law.  
The development of the instrument of enhanced cooperation, or closer cooperation as it was 
called then, introduced the possibility to realize certain policy projects within the realm of the 
Union’s conferred competences, i.e. beneath the level of primary law, without the need to include 
all Member States. Groups of Member States could now come together and adopt legal rules that 
would apply to the participating members of that group only. While established as a reaction to 
the call for more flexibility in EU law, the instrument of enhanced cooperation remained unused 
for more than a decade.  
Only recently, Member States started to make use of enhanced cooperation. The aim of this 
paper is to give some prospect for future practice. To this end, it will give an overview of the 
coming into being of enhanced cooperation in the chronology of flexible integration (infra B.), 
followed by a detailed description of the current cases of enhanced cooperation (infra C.). Based 
on this, it will try and draw some conclusions on the lessons learnt from recent practice (infra 
D.). 
 
B. Development of flexible integration 
The objective of establishing an “ever closer Union” has been part of European integration from 
the outset. It intends to safeguard the supranational acquis and further integration and by 
gradually removing remaining derogations1 and legal, socio-political and economic differences 
between the members to the extent necessary. An ever closer union is characterised by the axiom 
of uniform integration of differing national legal orders towards a European legal order in which 
                                                           
1 Blanke, in Blanke/Mangiameli (eds.), The Treaty on European Union, A Commentary, 2013, Article 1 TEU para. 
26; Calliess, in Calliess/Ruffert (eds.), EUV/AEUV, 5th ed. 2016, Article 1 EUV para. 12 f. 
rules and obligations are equally binding for all Member States,2 but which does not necessarily 
mean centralisation of power or full harmonisation of legislation. In this context, the CJEU as 
early as 1964 held in its famous judgment in Costa v. E.N.E.L. that “the executive force of Community 
Law cannot vary from one State to another […] without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the 
Treaty”.3 
The “concerted action” necessary for the “removal of existing obstacles”4 was rather easy to 
achieve among the six Western European States that founded the EEC. The accession of 
additional Member States since the 1970s, especially the Eastern enlargement of 2004/2007, led 
to a growth of the Union to a total of currently 28 members. This not only increased the number 
of decision-makers in the Community/Union; more importantly it also increased the number of 
voices, views, cultural and social traditions and historical experience, all of which shape each 
Member State’s view on the purpose, development and future of European integration. It soon 
became obvious that an ever closer Union in the form of uniform integration of all Member 
States would be harder and harder to achieve. Deeper integration and further steps forward 
would be more difficult in the context of the growing heterogeneity of the Community’s/Union’s 
members.5 The imminent withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Union is a vivid example. 
The apparent antagonism between “ever closer union” and “united in diversity” is characteristic 
of the development of forms of flexible integration which also tries to find a balance between the 
widening and the deepening of integration.  
The idea of a non-simultaneous integration dates back, inter alia, to the 1975 Tindemans report. 
Then Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans suggested that, with regard to economic and 
monetary policy and with a view to the divergence of the national economic and financial 
situations of the Member States, “it is impossible at the present time to submit a credible programme of 
action if it is deemed absolutely necessary that in every case all stages should be reached by all the States at the same 
time.” Instead, he suggested that “those States which are able to progress have a duty to forge ahead” while 
the others will temporarily remain behind. The Member States staying behind then receive from 
the progressing States “any aid and assistance that can be given [to] them to enable them to catch the others 
up”. However, Tindemans expressly noted that “[t]his does not mean Europe à la carte: each country will be 
                                                           
2 Becker, Differenzierungen der Rechtseinheit durch „abgestufte Integration“, Europarecht Beiheft 1/1998, p. 29 
(33); Bender, Die Verstärkte Zusammenarbeit nach Nizza, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und 
Völkerrecht, 2001, 729 (731 f.); Blanke, in Grabitz/Hilf/Nettesheim (eds.), Das Recht der Europäischen Union: 
EUV/AEUV, 2010, Article 20 EUV para. 5; Hatje, Die institutionelle Reform der Europäischen Union, 
Europarecht, 2001, p. 143 (160). 
3 CJEU, Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, p. 594. 
4 Fourth recital of the preamble to the EEC Treaty.  
5 Becker, (fn. 2), p. 40; Bender, (fn. 2), p. 732 f.; Martenczuk, Die differenzierte Integration nach dem Vertrag von 
Amsterdam, Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien, 1998, p. 447 (448 f.). 
bound by the agreement of all as to the final objective to be achieved in common; it is only the timescales for 
achievement which vary.”6  
Before the introduction of the instrument of closer or enhanced cooperation (infra 4.), flexible 
integration was found mostly at the level of primary EU/EC law, namely in the Schengen law 
and what later became the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (infra 1.), the Economic and 
Monetary Union (infra 2.) and the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (infra 3.).7 
 
1. Schengen and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
The first great turning point in the process of uniform and simultaneous integration came about 
with the Schengen Agreement of 1985 and the 1990 Schengen Convention implementing the 
Agreement.8 Five of the ten Member States of the then European Economic Community decided 
to deepen integration in the field of free movement of persons and the abolition of internal 
border controls. Since not all Member States wanted to participate in this form of closer 
cooperation, the willing Member States had to make use of cooperation outside the Community’s 
legal and institutional framework by means of an international Treaty regime. It was only with the 
Treaty of Amsterdam that the Schengen acquis was transferred into the Union’s legal framework 
(Schengen Protocol).9 For those Member States not willing to participate, namely Denmark, the 
United Kingdom and Ireland, the Treaty revision included a complex system of permanent legal 
opt-outs.10 
For the Schengen Group (that is all Union Member States except Ireland and the United 
Kingdom) the development of the Schengen acquis works in accordance with the rules on 
enhanced cooperation. To this end, Article 1 of the Schengen Protocol provides that the 
members of the Schengen Group shall be authorised to establish closer cooperation among 
themselves in areas covered by provisions defined by the Council which constitute the Schengen 
acquis.  
 
                                                           
6 Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the European Council, Bulletin of the European 
Communities, Supplement 1/76, available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/942/1/political_tindemans_report.pdf  
7 See on this also Böttner, The Development of Flexible Integration in EC/EU Practice, in 
Giegerich/Schmitt/Zeitzmann (eds.), How much Differentiation and Flexibility can European Integration bear?, 
2017, p. 59 ff. 
8 On the history of Schengen, see also Duić, in Blanke/Mangiameli (eds.), The Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, Protocol No. 19, para. 4 ff. (forthcoming).  
9 Now Protocol No. 19 on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union, O.J. 2012 C 
326, p. 290. 
10 Protocol No. 2 to the Treaty of Amsterdam, now Protocol No. 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice (O.J. 2012 C 326, p. 295) and Protocol No. 22 on the 
position of Denmark (O.J. 2012 C 326, p. 299).  
2. Economic and Monetary Union 
Another important area of asynchronicity of European law is the Economic and Monetary 
Union,11 which was introduced to EU law by the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht. Here as well, not all 
Member States were willing to participate in this new step of integration but were ready to let the 
remaining Member States proceed. Nevertheless, the consensus was that the EMU would not be 
based on a “pick and choose” model; it should not be up to every Member State to decide 
separately whether to participate or not.12 While Denmark and the United Kingdom were granted 
opt-outs that were guaranteed by means of Protocols attached to the Treaties,13 every acceding 
Member State since Maastricht is under the obligation to eventually join the third stage of the 
EMU and introduce the euro currency. In the meantime, they are treated as “Member States with 
derogations”.14  
Differentiation between Member States is reflected in the institutional setting of EMU. 
Composed of the ministers of those Member States whose currency is the euro (the “Euro 
Group”), the Council shall adopt measures specific to those Member States whose currency is the 
euro (Article 136 TFEU). The Member States forming the Eurozone shall elect a president for 
the Euro Group (Article 2 of Protocol No. 14) and only members of the Council representing 
Member States whose currency is the euro shall take part in the vote for adopting the measures.15 
Similar institutional differentiation is found in the decision-making structure of the ECB, the 
central institution of the European System of Central Banks or, in most cases, the Eurosystem.16  
The 2008 financial crisis, which developed into a “euro crisis”, led to further dynamic 
development and the need to enhance cooperation among the euro area members in order to 
overcome the situation and strengthen the EMU framework.17 As, on the one hand, the Union 
did not possess the required competences and, on the other hand, consensus among all Member 
States on a necessary Treaty amendment could not be reached, the willing Member States again 
                                                           
11 On flexibility in EMU, see also Deubner, Deepened Integration in the Eurozone?, in Giegerich/Schmitt/Zeitzmann 
(fn. 7), p. 183 ff., and Lacchi, How Much Flexibility Can European Integration Bear in Order to Face the Eurozone 
Crisis? Reflections on the EMU  
inter se International Agreements Between EU Member States, in Giegerich/Schmitt/Zeitzmann (fn. 7), p. 225 ff. 
12 Louis, L’Union européenne et sa monnaie, Commentaire J. Mégret, vol. 6, 2nd ed. 1995, p. 148. 
13 See now, under the Treaty of Lisbon, Protocol No. 15 on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom and 
Protocol No. 16 on certain provisions relating to Denmark. On Denmark, see Howarth, The Compromise on 
Denmark and the Treaty on European Union: A Legal and Political Analysis, Common Market Law Review, 1994, 
p. 765 ff. 
14 See, most recently, Article 5 of the Act of Accession of Croatia, O.J. 2012 L 112, p. 21, 36. 
15 With regard to institutional differentiation in the European System of Central Banks, see Zilioli/Selmayr, The law of 
the European Central Bank, 2004, chapter 4 (The European Central Bank and Differentiated Integration). 
16 On this, see Böttner, The size and structure of the European Commission – Legal issues surrounding project teams 
and a (future) reduced College, European Constitutional Law Review, 2018, p. 37 (54 f.). 
17 Blanke, The European economic and Monetary Union – Between vulnerability and reform, International Journal of 
Public Law and Policy, 2011, p. 402 ff. 
had to resort to cooperation outside the Union’s framework.18 This led to the negotiation of two 
international agreements, namely the Treaty establishing a European Stability Mechanism (ESM 
Treaty) and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union (the so-called “Fiscal Compact”).19  
 
3. Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Another major achievement of the Treaty of Maastricht was the introduction of a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy20 under the roof of the newly founded European Union. Taking into 
account the high obstacle that the prescribed unanimity in this policy area entailed,21 Member 
States agreed on Declaration No. 27 which provided that “with regard to Council decisions 
requiring unanimity, Member States will, to the extent possible, avoid preventing a unanimous 
decision where a qualified majority exists in favour of that decision”.  
The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced in Article 23(1) subpara. 2 TEU another novelty in the 
form of qualified abstention. In that case, the Member State making a formal declaration to that 
effect, shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the 
Union.” At first sight, this opens up the possibility of so-called “coalitions of the able and 
willing”. Since the introduction of this possibility, CFSP actions have no longer depended on the 
approval and implementation of all Member States and this more flexible approach allowed for 
smaller groups of States to engage in a certain action or to adopt a position. On closer inspection, 
however, non-participation through the issuing of a formal declaration did not at all deprive the 
abstaining Council member from the binding effect of the adopted decision. After all, the 
decision made by the Council remains a “Union decision”. While the abstaining State may not be 
obliged by and asked to actively implement this decision, it has to accept that “the decision 
commits the Union”.22 However, these Member States are exempt from the financing of 
operations with military or defence implications (Article 28(3) subpara. 2 TEU-Amsterdam, now 
Article 41(2) subpara. 2 TEU).23 
The most important innovation as regards flexibility in the field of Common Foreign and 
Security Policy may be the introduction of “permanent structured cooperation” (Articles 42(6), 
                                                           
18 See, among others, Uerpmann-Wittzack, Völkerrecht als Ausweichordnung, Europarecht Beiheft, 2013, p. 49 ff. 
19 On the Fiscal Compact and the ESM, see in more detail Lo Schiavo, The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance and the ESM Treaty: Intergovernmental Arrangements Outside EU Law, but for the Benefit of the 
EMU?, in Giegerich/Schmitt/Zeitzmann (fn. 7), p. 195 ff. 
20 On flexibility in CFSP, see von Kielmansegg, The Common Foreign and Security Policy – A Pool of Flexibility 
Models, in Giegerich/Schmitt/Zeitzmann (fn. 7), p. 139 ff. 
21 Böttner/Wessel, in Blanke/Mangiameli (fn. 1), Article 31 TEU, para. 3.  
22 Böttner/Wessel, Blanke/Mangiameli (fn. 1), Article 31 TEU, para. 16. 
23 See Schmidt-Radefeldt, in Blanke/Mangiameli (fn. 1), Article 41 TEU, para. 18. 
46 TEU and Protocol No. 10). Article 17 TEU-Nice recognised the possibility for Member States 
to cooperate more closely outside the Union’s framework in the security policy and it was only 
with the Treaty of Lisbon that closer cooperation in this area was made possible within the EU 
framework.24 According to Article 42(6) TEU, those Member States whose military capabilities 
fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area 
with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation 
within the Union framework. The instrument of permanent structured cooperation is very similar 
to the instrument of enhanced cooperation,25 but there are some important differences, most 
notably: no unanimity requirement for the authorising decision, no minimum number of 
participants and no equivalent to the last resort requirement in Article 20(2) TEU.  
With regard to the development of differentiation and flexibility, the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy has taken a different road compared to the policy areas outlined above. While the 
extent of differentiation in the form of permanent opt-outs has been kept to a minimum, the 
most recent history has brought about a growing number of instruments of flexible integration. 
On the one hand, this may enable a dynamic development of Union foreign policy with the 
possibility for groups of Member States to go ahead and take further steps, which not all Member 
States may be willing to take. This takes account of individual concerns with regard to national 
sovereignty. On the other hand, this evolution bears the risk of introducing incoherence into the 
Union’s foreign action. If different groups of Member States cooperate in individual areas of 
foreign policy, inconsistencies may arise and the Union as a whole may be impeded from 
speaking with one voice on the international scene. Therefore, flexibility in Common Foreign and 
Security Policy should be used with the utmost caution. 
 
4. The Instrument of Enhanced Cooperation as Enabling Clause 
Until the Treaty of Amsterdam, flexible integration was based solely on a system of international 
treaties and primary law opt-outs introduced in the course of Treaty revisions. With the Eastern 
enlargement coming up,26 the Amsterdam revision introduced a primary-law based instrument by 
means of which groups of Member States could form closer cooperation among themselves in 
                                                           
24 Cf. von Kielmansegg, in Blanke/Mangiameli (fn. 1), Article 46 TEU, para. 1-2. 
25 On the relationship between those two instruments, see von Kielmansegg, in Blanke/Mangiameli (fn. 1), Article 46 
TEU, para. 30-32. 
26 Cf. Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Brussels, 5 December 1996, 
The European Union today and tomorrow – A general outline for a draft revision of the Treaties, CONF/2500/96, 
section V, no. 5; see also Göler, Differenzierte Integration: konzeptionelle Überlegungen, politische Projekte und 
theoretische Ansätze, in Stratenschulte (ed.), Der Anfang vom Ende?, 2015, p. 9 (11 f.). 
secondary law (Articles 40, 43 f. TEU and Article 11 TEC).27 Enhanced cooperation, as it is now 
called, is an offer to cooperate within the Treaties’ framework rather than outside. While the 
introduction of this new instrument of cooperation was welcomed, the construction was 
considered too rigid and complex.28 The Treaty of Nice reacted to this criticism and somewhat 
lowered the hurdles,29 but a number of restrictions were retained.30 However, despite all the 
discussions on the need to introduce a new instrument of flexible cooperation, the instrument of 
enhanced cooperation remained unused.  
In accordance with the abolishment of the pillar structure, the Treaty of Lisbon streamlined the 
provisions on enhanced cooperation. The central provision is now found in Article 20 of the 
Union’s “constitution” (the TEU), while the working details have been collected in the TFEU 
(Articles 326-334). In addition, a number of novel elements have been introduced such as specific 
passerelle clauses for enhanced cooperation (Article 333 TFEU) or “accelerator clauses” which 
provide for a sort of automatism for initiating enhanced cooperation in the field of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters (Articles 82(3), 83(3), 86(1) subpara. 3, Article 87(3) TFEU).31  
 
C. Practice of enhanced cooperation 
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the instrument of enhanced cooperation has 
been used in at least four cases: for the regulation on the law applicable to divorce and legal 
separation (Rome III) (see infra 1.), to regulate unitary patent protection (infra 2.), for a 
cooperation to establish a European financial transaction tax (infra 3.), and on the “twin 
regulations” for the property regimes of international couples (infra 4.). The European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office has also been established by means of enhanced cooperation, but with an 
expedited procedure (infra 5.). The following section will present these cases as well as the 
permanent structured cooperation established in CFSP (infra 6.). This shall lay the foundation for 
the analysis of current practice and prospects for the future (infra section D.). 
 
                                                           
27 Cf. also Pechstein, in Streinz (ed.), EUV/AEUV, 2nd ed. 2012, Article 20 EUV, para. 1. 
28 See, among others, Janning, Dynamik in der Zwangsjacke: Flexibilität in der Europäischen Union nach Amsterdam, 
integration, 1997, p. 285 ff. 
29 Shaw, The Treaty of Nice: Legal and Constitutional Implications, European Public Law, 2001, p. 195 (202); 
Rodrigues, Le Traité de Nice et les coopérations renforcées au sein de l’Union européenne, Revue du Marché commun 
et de l'Union européenne, 2001, p. 11 (14); Giering/Janning, Flexibilität als Katalysator der Finalität? Die 
Gestaltungskraft der “verstärkten Zusammenarbeit” nach Nizza, integration, 2001, p. 146 (154). 
30 Cf. Blanke, in Blanke/Mangiameli (fn. 1), Article 20 TEU, para. 12. 
31 Blanke, in Blanke/Mangiameli (fn. 1), Article 20 TEU, para. 17. 
1. Law applicable to divorce and legal separation (Rome III) 
Enhanced cooperation was already used for the first time within one year of the Treaty of 
Lisbon’s entering into force, even though the initiation dates back to pre-Lisbon times. On 17 
July 2006, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation 
(EC) No 2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction and introducing rules concerning applicable law in 
matrimonial matters.32 The first orientation proposed by the Council Presidency was supported 
by the vast majority of Member States, only two where in opposition regarding certain aspects of 
the proposal.33 As unanimity was required, the Council at its meeting of 5/6 June 2008 
established that the objectives of Rome III could not be attained within a reasonable period by 
applying the relevant provisions of the Treaties and considered therefore to revert to enhanced 
cooperation.34  
By letters dated July 28, 2008, a group of originally eight Member States (which was sufficient 
under the pre-Lisbon rules) requested authorisation to establish enhanced cooperation in the area 
of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation.35 A number of Member States joined the 
initiative during the course of the following months36 while Greece withdrew its original 
declaration to participate on March 3, 2010.  
By March 24, 2010, the Commission submitted a proposal for a Council Decision authorising 
enhanced cooperation for 14 Member States.37 While the Member States’ requests were made 
under the Nice Treaty, the submission of the Commission’s proposal was submitted only after 
the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. Therefore, the Council Decision had to comply with the 
new rules on enhanced cooperation. In June 2010, the Council authorised enhanced 
cooperation.38 On the basis of Article 81(3) TFEU, an implementing act was adopted (the so 
                                                           
32 COM(2006) 399 final of 17 July 2006. 
33 Council Doc. 9566/07 of 14 June 2007, p. 3 
34 See Press Release of the 2887th Council meeting (Justice and Home Affairs) on 24/25 July 2008, Council Doc. 
11653/08, p. 23. On the development see also Fiorini, Harmonizing the law applicable to divorce and legal separation 
– Enhanced cooperation as the way forward? International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2010, p. 1143 ff.; for a 
historic account, see also Henderson, From Brussels to Rome: The necessity of resolving divorce law conflicts across 
the European Union, Wisconsin International Law Journal, 2010-2011, p. 768 (779 f.). 
35 Greece, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, Hungary, Austria, Romania and Slovenia. 
36 Bulgaria by letter dated 12 August 2008, France by a letter dated 12 January 2009, Germany by a letter dated 15 
April 2010, Belgium by a letter dated 22 April 2010, Latvia by a letter dated 17 May 2010, Malta by a letter dated 31 
May 2010 and Portugal during the Council meeting of 4 June 2010. The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark 
made use of their primary law opt-outs (see on this Böttner (fn. 7), p. 60 f.). 
37 COM(2010) 104 final. 
38 Council Decision 2010/405/EU of 12 June 2010 authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the law 
applicable to divorce and legal separation, O.J. 2010 L 189, p. 12. 
called “Rome III Regulation”).39 Two Member States have since acceded to the cooperation and 
the implementing legislation. 
 
2. Unitary Patent Protection 
The creation of unitary patent protection in the Member States of the Union together with a 
unified European patent litigation system has been another issue on the Commission’s agenda, 
which could not be pushed through for a number of years. The first proposal by the European 
Commission dates back to August 2000.40 A general approach has been adopted by the Council 
at a meeting in May 200141 which reflected general acceptance among the Member States on the 
adoption of the Community patent system. The Permanent Representatives Committee was 
instructed to press ahead with work on all remaining aspects that were cause of disagreement, 
and to resolve principal difficulties of the various delegations with the common approach. It 
became evident that the proposed language regime was one of these hard-to-resolve issues. The 
European Commission suggested that a Community patent shall have legal effect in the entire 
Union after it has been granted by the EPO in one of the three official languages (English, 
French, and German) and after the patent has been published in that language, together with a 
translation of the claims in the other two official languages. 
A common political approach had been agreed on by March 200342 and by November 2003, 
broad agreement had been reached on a compromise text presented by the Council Presidency. 
However, one delegation was unable to agree to the proposed compromise.43 Further discussion 
led to a compromise package with alternative44 which was put to a vote in May 2004, but with 
negative votes by the French, the German, the Portuguese and the Spanish delegations, the 
                                                           
39 Council Regulation (EU) No. 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of 
the law applicable to divorce and legal separation, O.J. 2010 L 343, p. 10. On the content of the regulation, see 
Lemoine, Rome III Regulation: Getting Divorced in Europe, in Giegerich/Schmitt/Zeitzmann (fn. 7), p. 251 ff.; 
Zeitzmann, Das Verfahren der Verstärkten Zusammenarbeit und dessen erstmalige Anwendung, ZEuS, 2011, 
p. 105 ff.; Rudolf, Europäisches Kollisionsrecht für Ehescheidungen – Rom III-VO, ZFE, 2012, S. 101 ff.; Hammje, 
Le nouveau règlement (UE) n°1259/2010 du Conseil du 20 décembre 2010 mettant en oeuvre une coopération 
renforcée dans le domaine de la loi applicable au divorce et à la séparation de corps, Revue critique de droit 
international privé 2011, p. 291 ff.; Hummer, Der Bann ist gebrochen: Die ersten Ermächtigungen zur „verstärkten 
Zusammenarbeit“ in der EU, EuZ, 2011, p. 83 ff.; Ottaviano, La prima cooperazione rafforzata dell’Unione europea, 
Il Diritto dell’Unione Europea 2011, S. 131 ff.; Franzina, The law applicable to divorce and legal separation under 
Regulation (EU) No. 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010, Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional, 2011, p. 85 ff. See 
also Kuipers, The Law Applicable to Divorce as Test Ground for Enhanced Cooperation, European Law Journal, 
2012, p. 201 ff. 
40 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Patent of 1 August 2000, COM(2000) 412 final.  
41 Council Doc. 9418/01, 2351th session of the Council “Internal Market, Consumers, Tourism”, of 30/31 May 2001, 
p. 8 f. and 15 f. 
42 Council Doc. 6874/1/03, 2490th Council meeting “Competitiveness”, 3 March 2003, p. 15 ff. and Council Doc. 
7159/03 of 7 March 2003. 
43 Cf. Council Doc. 15141/03, 2547th Council meeting “Competitiveness”, 26/27 November 2003, p. 9. 
44 Council Doc. 7119/04 of 8 March 2004. 
Council could not reach unanimous agreement and the Presidency intended to bring the results 
of the vote to the European Council’s attention45 which decided to prescribe a “period of 
reflection” for the Community Patent.46 Discussions on the proposal were re-launched in the 
Council after adoption by the Commission of the Communication “Enhancing the patent system 
in Europe” in April 2007.47 Within that period, the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force and 
provided a new, specific legal basis for the creation of unitary intellectual property rights within 
the European Union (Article 118 TFEU) according to which unanimity was still required for 
deciding on the language arrangements of such titles, but all the other aspects thereof would from 
then on be decided upon by qualified majority under the ordinary legislative procedure. 
Therefore, the Presidency suggested to first focus on the draft Regulation on the European 
Union patent and to leave the decision on the translation arrangements to be taken at a later 
stage.48 
Accordingly, on 30 June 2010 the Commission adopted a proposal for a Council Regulation on 
the translation arrangements for the EU patent.49 The exchange of views on the draft political 
orientation in the Council was supported by a very large majority of the Member States, but it 
was stressed that a solution should be reached quickly. In this context, different Member States 
already considered the option of enhanced cooperation if that were not the case.50 After Spain 
and Italy had declared their persistent objection due to the planned language regime,51 it was clear 
that unanimity would not be reached and therefore this project could not be realised by the 
Union as whole. As a consequence, a group of twelve Member States52 addressed requests to the 
Commission by letters dated 7, 8 and 13 December 2010 indicating that they wished to establish 
enhanced cooperation. In the course of the procedure, another 13 Member States53 joined the 
proposal so that eventually, 25 of the then 27 Member States (excluding Spain and Italy) made 
use of this instrument of cooperation.54 Before long, Spain and Italy lodged judicial proceedings 
against the authorising decision, claiming that the creation of unitary patent protection according 
                                                           
45 Council Doc. 9586/04, 2683rd Council meeting “Competitiveness”, 17/18 May 2004, p. 8. 
46 Presidency Conclusions – Brussels, 17/18 June 2004, para. 42. 
47 COM(2007) 165. 
48 Council Doc. 16113/09 of 27 November 2009.  
49 COM(2010) 350.  
50 Council Doc. 14773/10, 3035th Council meeting “Competitiveness”, 11/12 October 2010, p. 5 f. 
51 Cf. the statement made by Italy and Spain: Council Doc. 17843/10 ADD1, 3057 th Council meeting 
“Competitiveness” 10 December 2010, p. 8 f. 
52 Denmark, Germany, Estonia, France, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom. 
53 Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Portugal, 
Romania and Slovakia. 
54 Council Decision 2011/167/EU of 10 March 2011 authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of 
unitary patent protection, O.J. 2011 L 76, p. 53; see in more detail Lamblin-Gourdin, Les coopérations renforcées au 
secours du brevet unique européen?, Revue de l’Union européenne, no. 557, 2012, p. 254 (258 f.) and Jaeger, The End 
to a Never-Ending Story?  The Unitary Patent Regime, in Giegerich/Schmitt/Zeitzmann (fn. 7), p. 269 ff. 
to Article 118 TFEU was an exclusive EU competence and thus not an appropriate subject for 
enhanced cooperation. These claims have been rejected by the Court of Justice.55 The 
participating Member States have adopted two implementing acts, one regulation on the patent56 
and one on the language regime57. Here as well, judicial claims have been rejected.58 Italy 
eventually gave up its resistance and joined the enhanced cooperation in September 2015.59 
 
3. Financial Transaction Tax 
As a reaction to the economic and financial crisis and as a means to dry out one of its sources, 
the Member States discussed the introduction of a tax on the purchase and sale of certain 
financial instruments, the so called financial transaction tax. The debate originated from the 
desire to ensure that the financial sector, who was given part of the blame for the crisis itself, 
contributes substantially to the costs of the crisis in order to disincentivise these institutions from 
engaging in risky activities in the future. Several EU Member States had already taken individual, 
divergent action in the area of financial sector taxation. 
The European Council of June 2010 agreed that Member States should introduce systems of 
levies and taxes on financial institutions to ensure fair burden-sharing and to set incentives to 
contain systemic risk.60 However, it was reported in the conclusions that the Czech Republic 
reserved its right not to introduce these measures. In late 2010, the Commission explored the 
option of taxation of the financial sector.61 In fall of the following year, the Commission 
presented a proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of financial transaction tax.62 
As a legal basis it indicated Article 113 TFEU, which requires unanimity in the Council.  
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Despite numerous meetings of the Council “Working Party on Tax Questions – Indirect Tax 
(FTT)”, which prepared the dossier for adoption, the Council took note in its orientation debate 
in August of 2012 that, in the light of views expressed by the Member States, support for a 
financial transaction tax as proposed by the Commission was not unanimous.63 At the same time 
the Presidency noted the support of a significant number of delegations for considering enhanced 
cooperation. Most notably, the Austrian delegation made a declaration that “[t]aking into account 
the current state of the negotiations on the introduction of a financial transaction tax Austria 
declares that such an introduction should be made possible by enhanced cooperation“.64 
As discussions in the Council did not lead to results, let alone the required unanimity, a group of 
eleven Member States65 decided to go ahead and introduce the financial transaction tax by means 
of enhanced cooperation and by letters received between 28 September and 23 October 2012 
addressed formal requests to the Commission. The Commission presented its proposal on 
October 23, 2012.66 During the Council debates, the Netherlands declared that they considered 
joining the enhanced cooperation, but formulated certain conditions: the financial transaction tax 
should not be dedicated to the EU own resources, it should be proportionate in order not to 
overburden the financial sector, and it should not have any direct or indirect impact on the 
pension funds of the Netherlands.67  
The Council authorised enhanced cooperation in January 2013,68 with the United Kingdom, 
Malta, the Czech Republic and Luxembourg abstaining in the vote. Some of them delivered 
unilateral statements which were added to the minutes of the Council meeting.69 Luxembourg 
regretted that agreement could not be reached at global or at least at Union level and considered 
that enhanced cooperation should not be used as a tool to impose such tax on financial 
institutions established in non-participating Member States. Similar concerns were raised by 
Malta. With a similar reasoning, the United Kingdom even expressed its opinion that it was not 
possible to take the view that the conditions for authorisation set out in the Treaties were not 
fulfilled for this particular cooperation. As a consequence the United Kingdom launched judicial 
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proceedings before the Court of Justice against the authorising decision. The Court, however, 
turned them down due to the lack of implementing measures at the time of the legal action.70  
In February 2013, the Commission submitted a new proposal for a financial transaction tax as an 
implementing measure for the enhanced cooperation.71 The tedious debates on the issue 
continued among the participating Member States in various Working Party and Council 
meetings on the “building blocks” of the financial transaction tax and different options on how 
to avoid potential negative impacts of such a tax on retirement schemes and the part of the 
economy that is concerned with producing, distributing and consuming goods and non-financial 
services (the “real economy”).72 Even to this date, no implementing measure has been adopted 
due to disagreement amongst the participating Member States as regards the details of the tax. 
On the contrary, negotiations in the Council led to Estonia’s withdrawal from the enhanced 
cooperation in December 2015, leaving only ten Member States trying to agree on the tax.  
 
4. Property regimes of international couples 
In March of 2011, the Commission adopted two proposals for Council Regulations on 
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions 1) in matters of 
matrimonial property regimes73 and 2) regarding the property consequences of registered 
partnerships.74 Based on Article 81(3) TFEU, which again requires unanimity in the Council, the 
aim of the proposals was to establish a comprehensive set of rules of international private law 
applicable to property regimes for marriages or registered partnerships, respectively, having cross-
border implications. Because of the distinctive features of marriage and registered partnerships, 
and of the different legal consequences resulting from these forms of union, the framework was 
split into two proposals. About a year and a half later, the Council Working Party on Civil Law 
Matters (Matrimonial Property Regimes and Registered Partnerships), which had carried out a 
parallel examination of both proposals, adopted political guidelines for future deliberation.75 After 
that, the proposals were subject to numerous examinations in the Working Party. Following the 
10th revised version of both proposals and bilateral contacts held with some Council delegations, 
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two compromise texts were presented in November 2014.76 By that time, eleven redraft texts had 
been presented to the Working Party, and discussed at length. It had been emphasised again that 
both Regulations have always been examined in parallel77 and in so far as possible, both 
regulations contain parallel provisions, in order to ensure equal treatment of spouses and 
partners. After a period of reflection and further deliberation, preliminary political agreement was 
reached in November 2015.78 It was then again underlined at a COREPER meeting that it was 
“of utmost importance that the two regulations be adopted together”79 so as to ensure equal 
treatment of couples throughout the Union. In the end, however, no agreement could be reached 
among all Council representatives, mainly due to the fact that not all difficulties, mainly linked to 
the fact that the institutions of same-sex marriages and/or registered partnerships were not 
known in a number of Member States, could be resolved. While sufficient safeguards were 
included to ensure that domestic courts would not have to deal with, let alone introduce, foreign 
institutions unknown in their legal system, some Member States were concerned that, 
nevertheless, the recognition in their country of the property consequences of such foreign 
institutions would have an indirect effect on their national family law and policy.  
As a consequence, the Council established that insurmountable difficulties made it impossible to 
attain such unanimity within a reasonable time.80 At the same time, however, a number of 
Member States stated their interest to adopt the proposed measures nonetheless. Therefore, from 
December 2015 to February 2016, seventeen Member States addressed requests to the 
Commission81 for presenting a proposal to authorise enhanced cooperation in the area of 
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of 
matrimonial property regimes and jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and 
enforcement of decisions regarding the property consequences of registered partnerships. The 
Commission presented its proposal in early March 2016.82 By letter to the Commission dated 18 
March 2016, Cyprus indicated its wish to participate in the establishment of the enhanced 
cooperation; Cyprus reiterated this wish during the work of the Council.  
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The Council eventually authorised enhanced cooperation in June 2016.83 The two Commission 
proposals had been adopted as implementing measures for that cooperation.84 While this is 
formally a whole different cooperation, it has strong ties to the enhanced cooperation on the 
Rome III Regulation. One would therefore imagine that the participating Member States are the 
same; in fact, however, the two groups overlap only in parts.85 
 
5. European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
The Treaty of Lisbon introduced a new competence for the European Union to establish a 
European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) from Eurojust (Article 86 TFEU). It shall be 
responsible for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment, the perpetrators of, and 
accomplices in, offences against the Union's financial interests, and shall exercise the functions of 
prosecutor in the competent courts of the Member States in relation to such offences. The 
regulation is subject to unanimity in the Council and consent by the European Parliament. 
In July 2013, the Commission presented a proposal for a Council Regulation on the 
establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office86 which was transmitted to the 
European Parliament and the Council on July 18, 2013. A first orientation debate took place in 
the Council on March 4, 2014,87 in which it was established that there is a vast consensus on the 
establishment of the EPPO and a general agreement on some major points of the proposal. The 
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark made use of their opt-outs88 and did not take part in the 
adoption of the proposed regulation.  
By the end of 2016, a broadly agreed consolidated draft text of the full Regulation had been 
established and received broad conceptual support in the Council. A few Member States made 
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known that they still had reservations on a few issues and Sweden mentioned that it would not, in 
any case, take part in the establishment of the EPPO. The Council Presidency worked to resolve 
these issues and substantial advances towards a generally accepted compromise had been made 
by late December of 2016, which resulted in an amended full text of the draft Regulation.89 The 
Council concluded that an agreement on the full text was now within reach. However, Sweden 
confirmed its general opposition to the adoption of EPPO. As a result, unanimity required by 
Article 86(1) TFEU (between all Member States except the United Kingdom, Ireland, and 
Denmark) could not be established.90 A group of Member States requested, by a letter of 14 
February 2017, that the draft Regulation be referred to the European Council, as foreseen in 
Article 86(1)(2) TFEU. On 9 March 2017, the European Council discussed the draft Regulation 
and noted that there was disagreement within the meaning of Article 86(1)(3) TFEU 
As a consequence, a group of 16 Member States91 made use of the option to establish enhanced 
cooperation on the basis of Article 86(1)(3) TFEU by means of “fast-track cooperation”.92 
Latvia,93 Estonia,94 Austria,95 and Italy96 joined the cooperation during the course of the following 
weeks. The Council eventually adopted the Regulation on EPPO in October 2017.97 Eventually, 
the Netherlands decided to join the cooperation.98 
 
6. Permanent Structured Cooperation 
The most recent practice of closer cooperation is a case of Permanent Structured Cooperation 
established in 2017, which resembles enhanced cooperation but is, technically speaking, a 
different instrument (see supra B.3). At its meeting in December 2016, the European Council 
concluded that “Europeans must take greater responsibility for their security”. In order to do so, 
the Heads of State or Government found that the Union and the Member States needed to do 
more, “including by committing sufficient additional resources” and by “reinforcing cooperation 
in the development of required capabilities as well as committing to making such capabilities 
available when necessary”.99 Based on previous Council conclusions, in particular the conclusions 
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of 14 November 2016,100 the European Council pointed towards Permanent Structured 
Cooperation as a means for the Member States to “contribute decisively to collective efforts, as 
well as to act autonomously when and where necessary”.101 It reiterated the need to launch this 
form of cooperation in its conclusions of June 2017102 and again in October 2017.103 
On 13 November 2017, a group of 23 Member States104 informed the Council and the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of their intention to 
participate in PESCO. On 7 December 2017, two other Member States joined the request.105 The 
joint notification106 sets out the list of ambitious and more binding common commitments 
undertaken by participating Member States in the five areas set out by Article 2 of Protocol 10 as 
well as the principles and governance of PESCO. 
Only a few days after the last notifications, the Council adopted the decision establishing 
Permanent Structured cooperation.107 A roadmap for the implementation of108 and a list of 
projects to be developed under PESCO109 supplement the original decision. 
 
D. Lessons learnt from recent practice  
It is striking that despite all the claims for the necessity of an instrument of flexible integration at 
the level of secondary law, it took over a decade until the instrument of enhanced cooperation 
was first used. One could indeed argue that this is a good sign, because the mere possibility to 
revert to integration with a smaller group of Member States was sufficient to overcome the veto 
of some members of the Union and eventually reach consensus and realise a project in the Union 
as a whole. This may have been easy within a Union of 15 members, but is more difficult in a 
community of nearly 30 members.  
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It appears that the Member States start to develop a certain routine for the realisation of policy 
objectives by means of flexible integration. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 
(and, to be precise, shortly before), Member State have become less hesitant to resort to 
enhanced cooperation in cases where agreement could not be reached within the Union at large. 
In this context, one can find that the Member States are cautious to establish enhanced 
cooperation and pay close attention to the requirement that such cooperation may only be 
initiated as a last resort. Most projects were deliberated among all Member States for a 
considerable length before they were found to be in a deadlock. 
What is remarkable, however, is the fact that to this day cases of enhanced cooperation could be 
observed only in areas that required a unanimous decision by all Union members, thus granting a 
veto position to each Member State in the Council. While under the ordinary legislative 
procedure (qualified majority in the Council), up to three veto players could be outvoted,110 
enhanced cooperation appears to be the only viable solution to overcome (political) stalemates in 
the Council if agreement by all members is required. The assessment of that fact is ambivalent. 
On the one hand, the implementation of enhanced cooperation often contained elements that 
prevented unanimity in the first place, thus making it less likely for the remaining Member States 
to join later. On the other hand, the accession of Member States to some forms of cooperation 
shows that a good implementation of enhanced cooperation can indeed have a pioneering effect, 
including the first-mover advantage for the cooperating Member States. However, the opposite 
may also happen, i.e. that Member States withdraw from an established cooperation. Flexibility 
and openness to join come with the price of openness to leave. 
At the very latest since the introduction of the instrument of enhanced cooperation, one can say 
that the idea of flexibility and differentiation has become a generally accepted approach of 
integration, maybe even a “constitutional principle”111 or an “architectural element”112 of the 
Union.113 The development of flexible integration shows that until now it was possible, at least to 
a great extent, to avoid the forming of a core Europe or integration à la carte. Differentiation 
should stick to the idea of a multispeed Europe in which, eventually, all or most Member States 
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will arrive at the same level of integration in a given area. Synchronicity is no longer a 
fundamental principle of European integration.  
However, the instrument of enhanced cooperation should be used with caution otherwise it runs 
the risk of remaining unimplemented or ineffective, as was the case with the financial transaction 
tax particularly due to the low number of participating Member States. There is also the risk that 
it creates a legally complex and maybe even confusing situation, for example when different cases 
of enhanced cooperation are closely related or overlap, while the groups of participating Member 
States vary (in the case of the conflict-of-law rules).  
At the same time, flexible integration has not – at least so far – led to a general disintegration or 
fragmentation of the Union. Nonetheless, this is a constant risk,114 especially in the light of 
increased cooperation outside the Union’s framework through international treaties and 
intergovernmental cooperation.115 In this regard, one should recall the principle of sincere 
cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU) and the primacy of Union law, which should prevent the Member 
States from adopting rules outside the Union’s framework that could frustrate the acquis 
communautaire and call into question the ever closer Union. 
Finally, if one looks at the patterns of participation of Member States in the different forms of 
closer cooperation (including PESCO), one may find there to be a sort of “core Europe” 
emerging. Eight Member States, including four of the founding members (Germany, Italy, 
France, Belgium) take part in all cases of cooperation, other Member States known to be hesitant 
towards European integration take part in only one (United Kingdom, Denmark) or two (Ireland, 
Poland) cases of closer cooperation. This development certainly needs attention in the future 
practice of flexible integration. 
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